



Pressure on employers to adopt ethical 
employment practices is beginning to 
intensify. This is in tune with the mood ol 
the times. The government has 
proclaimed its commitment to fairness at 
work and although, at the time of writing, 
it had not had am opportunity to enact 
legislation so as to translate that
o
commitment into practice, it is 
foreseeable that before long there will be
o
a variety of legislative measures which 
have the effect of penalising employers 
tor unethical behaviour. However 
significant developments in this area pre- 
date the 1997 general election. It seems 
likely that in due course there will be 
widespread recognition that the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (whatever its 
shortcomings) was a landmark statute, 
giving disabled people rights of redress 
for the first time in respect of unethical 
treatment by employers. The abolition of 
the cap on compensation awards in cases 
of sex and race discrimination has already 
had the effect of stimulating claims, for 
example, by victims ol sexual and racial 
harassment. In the past, when the 
median level of compensation awards for 
harassment victims was low, there were 
often strong practical disincentives to 
protest against unethical treatment. The 
barriers are starting to be lifted.
The focus of this article, however, is on
the judiciary's growing awareness that 
the continuing development of the 
common law needs to chime a little more 
closely with social concerns in this area. 
The tensions between traditional (and 
generally rigid) common law doctrines of 
contract and tort as compared to 
contemporary notions such as that of 
'fairness' in the context ol unfair 
dismissal claims has, for example, long 
been a source of concern to employment 
practitioners. Now the tide is turning: a 
point illustrated by the cases selected for 
discussion here.
IMPLIED TERMS
In Malik &^ Anor v Bank of Credit &^ 
Commerce International SA [1997] IRLR 
462, the House ol Lords was prepared to 
interpret an existing and well-recognised 
implied term in a way that will provide 
employees with enhanced protection 
against unethical employer behaviour. 
The employees were dismissed on the 
grounds of redundancy by the provisional 
liquidators of BCCI. Neither had since 
then been able to obtain alternative 
employment in the linancial services 
sector. They sought 'stigma' damages for 
pecuniary loss which they attributed to 
the Bank's breach of the implied 
contractual obligation ol mutual trust 
and confidence. They argued that their 
mere association with the Bank at the 
moment of its liquidation, and the 
alleged fraudulent practices within the 
Bank that subsequently attracted public 
notoriety, put them at a disadvantage in 
the employment market, even though 
they were personally innocent of any 
wrongdoing. The liquidators rejected the 
claims and a High Court judge decided 
that the evidence failed to disclose a 
reasonable cause of action or a 
sustainable claim for damages. Affirming 
that decision, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that, in reality, the damages 
claimed were for injury to the employees' 
previously existing reputations and, 
therefore, in accordance with the general 
principles established in Addis v 
Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488 and 
subsequent authorities, were not legally
recoverable (Malik Si^Anor v Bank of Credit 
^ Commerce International SA [1995] IRLR 
375).
It was agreed that the employees' 
contracts contained an implied term to 
the effect that the Bank would not, 
without reasonable and proper cause, 
conduct itself in a manner likely to 
destroy or seriously damage the 
relationship of confidence and trust 
between the parties. However, the 
liquidators contended that there could be 
no breach of such a term unless three 
implied limitations were satisfied, i.e.:
  that the conduct complained of was 
conduct involving the treatment of the 
employee in question;
  that the employee was aware of such 
conduct while he was an employee; 
and
  that such conduct was calculated to 
destroy or seriously damage the trust 
between the employer and the 
employee.
It was submitted that those conditions 
were not satisfied on the facts of the case 
and it was further contended that, as a 
matter of policy, the law does not permit 
the recovery of damages for breach of 
contract in respect of injury to an 
existing reputation.
DECISION REVERSED
Reversing the Court of Appeal's 
decision, the House of Lords held that 
damages for loss of reputation caused by 
a breach of contract may be awarded, 
provided that a relevant breach of 
contract can be established and the 
requirements of causation, remoteness 
and mitigation can be satisfied. If 
conduct by the employer, in breach of the 
implied term of trust and confidence, 
prejudicially affects an employee's future 
prospects so as to give rise to continuing 
financial losses and it was reasonably 
foreseeable that such a loss was a serious 
possibility, in principle, damages in 
respect of that loss should be recoverable. 
Addis was decided in the days before this 
implied term had been adumbrated. 
Now that the term exists and is normally
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implied in every contract of employment, 
damages for its breach should be assessed 
in accordance with contractual 
principles. An employer which operates 
its business in a dishonest and corrupt 
manner is in breach ot the implied term: 
in agreeing to work for the employer an 
employee, whatever his status, cannot be 
taken to have agreed to work in 
furtherance of a dishonest business. The 
implied obligation extends to any 
conduct by the employer likely to destroy 
or seriously damage the relationship of 
trust and confidence. The motives of the 
employer cannot be determinative or 
even relevant in judging the employee's 
claims for damages for breach of the 
implied terms. Nor is it a necessity for 
the employee to have known of the trust- 
destroying conduct while still employed. 
Some forms of such conduct may have 
continuing adverse effects on an
o
employee. Nor could it be accepted that 
there is no breach unless the employee's 
confidence is actually undermined. 
Breach occurs where the proscribed 
conduct takes place: here, operating a 
dishonest and corrupt business.
This is a significant decision. Its 
realism is welcome. Some commentators 
have suggested that it will open the 
floodgates to litigation. That will not 
necessarily prove to be the case; Lord 
Steyn expressed the view that it is 
improbable that many employees would 
be able to prove 'stigma compensation'. 
Nevertheless, those employed by 
organisations which do conduct a 
dishonest and corrupt business now have 
a substantial right of redress.
NEW IMPLIED TERMS
The courts have in recent times not 
only been prepared to interpret existing 
contractual terms with a degree of 
creativity; they have also been willing on 
occasion to discover new implied terms. 
A striking example can be found in the 
judgement of Sedley J in Aspden v Webbs 
Poultry &^Meat Group (Holdings) Ltd [1996] 
IRLR 521. The employers established a 
generous permanent health insurance 
scheme; an eligible employee who was 
wholly incapacitated by sickness or injury 
from continuing to work would receive
o
an amount equivalent to 75% of the last 
payable annual salary, beginning 26 weeks 
after the start of incapacity. Later, Mr 
Aspden entered into a written contract 
which contained both a general power to 
terminate and a specific power to dismiss 
in the event of the employee's prolonged
illness. He was dismissed while on sick 
leave and before becoming eligible for 
benefit under the permanent health 
insurance scheme. He maintained that it 
was an implied term of his contract that, 
save for summary dismissal, the 
employers would not terminate the 
contract while he was incapacitated for 
work. The employers argued that the 
alleged term was inconsistent with the 
express provisions of the contract and 
thus could not be implied. Sedley J ruled 
in favour of the employee's contention 
and held that both parties knew, or would 
have realised had thev considered it, that 
the written contractual terms were not 
comprehensive and that they required 
qualification. The written contract was 
neither drafted with the insurance 
scheme in mind, nor was its aptness in 
the light of the scheme considered or 
negotiated. The contract itself was 
internally inconsistent in its provision for 
sick pay and termination. The situation 
in which the contract was entered into 
was bilaterally known to include a 
permanent health insurance scheme, 
which could only work if the employees 
whom it covered remained in 
employment for the duration of their 
incapacity, or until some other 
terminating event specified in the policy 
took place, and it was the unambiguous 
mutual intention of the parties that this 
should be so. That mutual intent did not 
impinge upon the ability of the 
employers at any time to accept the 
employee's repudiatory conduct as 
putting an end to the contract and with it 
the entitlement to insurance benefit. It is 
noteworthy that Sedley J expressly had 
regard to 'the justice of the case' which, 
in his view, meant that the precise 
mechanism by which effect should be 
given to that justice was 'of much less 
importance to a lay person than [to] 
lawyers'. His primary concern was with a 
just (or, he might have said, ethical) 
outcome. More recently, in Brompton v 
AOC International Ltd Si^Anor [1997] IRLR 
639, Staughton LI said obiter that 'there is
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a good deal to be said' for there being an
o o
implied term in the contracts of 
employees eligible for schemes of the 
kind supported by Sedley J in Aspden .
WORKPLACE SMOKING
Even more significant in its 
implications is the decision of the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal in Waltons 
S^Morse v Dorrinaton [1997] IRLR 488.
A long-serving secretary who worked
for a firm of solicitors and who was a 
non-smoker was moved to an area close 
to rooms occupied by three heavy 
smokers. She found the smoke a source 
of nuisance and discomfort and raised 
her concerns with her employers. They 
designated a specific smoking area, but in 
practice, that did not much improve the 
problem so far as the secretary was 
concerned. She took the matter up with 
her employers on a number of occasions 
with no success and was ultimately told 
that there was nothing more that could
o
be done and that she would either have to 
put up with the situation or leave. 
Distressed by this turn of events, she 
chose to go and claimed to have been 
constructively and unfairly dismissed.
An industrial tribunal upheld her claim 
and the employers' appeal was dismissed 
by the EAT. The EAT concluded that it is 
an implied term of every contract of 
employment that the employer will 
provide and monitor for employees, so 
far as is reasonably practicable, a working 
environment which is reasonably suitable 
for the performance by them of their 
contractual duties. The starting point for 
the implication of such a term is the duty 
on an employer under Health 8^ Safety at 
Work Act 1974, s. 2(2)(e), to provide and 
maintain a working environment for 
employees that is reasonably safe and 
without risk to health and is adequate as 
regards facilities and arrangements for
o o
their welfare at work. The right of an 
employee not to be required to sit in a 
smoke-tilled atmosphere affects the 
welfare of employees at work, even if it is 
not something which directly is 
concerned with their health, or can be 
proved to be a risk to health. The tribunal 
had been entitled to find that it was 
reasonably practicable for the employers 
to have provided the employee with a 
working environment suitable for the 
performance by her of her duties and, 
conversely, that the conditions in which 
they were requiring her to work rendered 
them in breach of the implied term.
The employers in this case did try to 
accommodate the secretary's concerns 
and the EAT acknowledged that, whilst 
finding that the employers failed to treat 
the employee in a way which was 
appropriate having regard to all the facts, 
including her length of service.
The implied term identified by the 
EAT is, however, so widely expressed that 
it will extend to assist employees who are 
confronted bv various forms of unethical
employer behaviour. For example, an 
employer who bullies an employee or 
who sits on his hands whilst an employee 
is bullied by a colleague, may not only be 
in breach of the implied duty of mutual 
trust and confidence, but also in breach 
of the duty to provide and maintain a 
reasonably safe working environment.
DISCRIMINATORY 
TREATMENT
Two relatively recent cases have seen 
significant extensions to the scope of an 
employer's responsibility to prevent an 
employee suffering discriminatory 
treatment. In imposing higher standards 
of responsibility on employers to 
safeguard their employees, and in 
refusing to allow those employers to 
shelter behind traditional common law 
doctrines, the Court ol Appeal and the 
EAT respectively have made potentially 
important contributions towards the 
implementation of ethical standards of 
conduct at the workplace.
The facts in Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd 
[1997] ICR 254, were remarkable. A 
young man of mixed ethnic parentage 
was employed at a shoe factory. During 
his time there he suffered physical and 
verbal racial abuse from two colleagues. 
That abuse consisted, amongst other 
matters, of burning his arm with a hot 
screwdriver, throwing metal bolts at his7 o
head and calling him racially abusive 
names. A supervisor moved him to 
another part of the factory but the abuse 
continued. The employee resigned and 
complained that he had been 
discriminated against by his employers on 
the ground of his race. An industrial 
tribunal upheld his complaint, but the 
EAT reversed that decision, accepting the 
employers' contention that the principle 
of vicarious liability at common law was 
applicable to the phrase 'in the course of 
his employment' in Race Relations Act 
1976, s. 32(1) and that, as the acts 
complained of were not modes of 
performing authorised tasks, the 
employers were not liable for those acts.
The Court of Appeal allowed the 
employee's appeal. Neither the linguistic 
constructions of s. 32(1) of the 1976 Act, 
nor its legislative purpose, justified an 
interpretation that applied the doctrine 
of an employer's vicarious liability at 
common law to the words 'in the course 
of his employment' in the section. It is a 
question of fact in the circumstances of 
each case for an industrial tribunal to
determine, on the ordinary meaning of 
the words, whether the acts complained 
of were done in the course of 
employment. Waite LJ emphasised that 
the general thrust of race and sex 
discrimination law 'was educative, 
persuasive and, where necessary, 
coercive.' It was acknowledged that an 
inevitable result of construing 'course of 
employment' in the sense for which the 
employers contended, would be that the 
more heinous the act of discrimination, 
the less likely it would be that the 
employer would be liable. The employers 
argued that this was all to the good: 
Parliament must have intended the 
liability of employers to be kept within 
reasonable bounds. Waite LJ rejected that 
submission entirely; it cut across the 
whole legislative scheme and underlying 
policy of the measures to deter racial and 
sexual harassment in the workplace 
through a widening of the net of
o o
responsibility beyond the guilty 
employees themselves, by making all 
employers additionally liable for such 
harassment and then supplying them with 
a 'reasonable steps' defence which would:
"... exonerate the conscientious employer 
who has used his best endeavours to prevent 
such harassment'
and would encourage all employers who 
had not yet undertaken such endeavours 
to take the steps necessary to make the 
same defence available in their own 
workplace.
THE BERNARD MANNING 
CASE
Waite EJ also referred to the decision 
of the EAT in Burton v DeVere Hotels Ltd 
[f997] ICR 1, as a useful illustration of 
the matters to which employers need to 
be alert if they are to be able to take 
advantage of the 'reasonable steps' 
defence in a harassment context.
In that case, two black waitresses were 
on duty at a hotel dinner at which the 
comedian Bernard Manning was the 
speaker. Mr. Manning made offensive 
remarks which upset the waitresses; two 
guests also made racially and sexually 
offensive remarks. An assistant manager
o
brought the incident to an end and 
apologised to the two women for what 
had happened. However they brought 
complaints of racial discrimination.
An industrial tribunal held that the 
employers had not discriminated against 
the waitresses by subjecting them to 
racial harassment from the speaker and
some of the diners. The EAT, however, 
concluded that there had been 
discrimination. The tribunal had erred in 
finding that although the employees had 
suffered a 'detriment' within the meaning 
of the 1976 Act; it was not the employers 
who had subjected them to the 
detriment, since they had neither 
knowingly stood by while the employees 
were abused, nor had they foreseen that 
the speaker would behave as he did.
According to the EAT, an employer 
subjects an employee to the detriment of 
racial harassment if he causes or permits 
harassment serious enough to amount to 
a detriment to occur, in circumstances in 
which he can control whether it happens 
or not. Foresight of the events, or the lack 
of it, is not determinative of whether the 
events were under the employer's 
control. In order to show that the 
employer 'subjected' the employee to the 
detriment of racial abuse or harassment, 
where the actual abuser or harasser is a 
third party and not an employee or agent 
of the employer, the tribunal should ask 
itself whether the event in question was 
something which was sufficiently under 
the control of the employer that he 
could, by the application of good 
employment practice, have prevented the 
harassment or reduced the extent of it. If 
such is the finding then the employer has 
subjected the employee to the 
harassment.
In the present case, it would have been 
good employment practice for the 
manager to warn his assistants to keep a 
look out for the speaker and to withdraw 
the waitresses if things became 
unpleasant. Events within the banqueting 
hall were under the control of the 
assistants and, if they had been properly 
instructed, the waitresses would not have 
suffered any harassment, save possibly for 
hearing a few offensive words before they 
were withdrawn. The EAT also expressed 
the view:
'... that it is undesirable that the concepts 
of the law of negligence should be imported 
into the statutory torts of racial and sexual 
discrimination'.
The decision is a graphic illustration of 
how far employment law has moved in a 
short time. Employees today have little 
choice but to take ethical employment 
practices seriously. @
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